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Abstract
This paper discusses a case study in formal verification and development of secure smart card
applications. An elementary Java Card electronic purse applet is presented whose specification can
be simply formulated as “in normal operation, the applet’s balance field can only be decreased, never
increased”. The applet features a challenge-response mechanism which allows legitimate terminals
to increase the balance by putting the applet into a special operation mode. A systematic approach
is used to guarantee a secure flow of control within the applet: appropriate transition properties are
first formalized as a finite state machine, then incorporated in the specification, and finally formally
verified using the Loop translation tool and the PVS theorem prover.
© 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Reasoning about the security of software systems can, in general, be done on two
distinct levels. The first level is the high abstract level of security protocols. On this level
different principals are distinguished that communicate with each other by sending ab-
stract messages over some untrusted network. Cryptographic primitives such as random
nonce generation, one-way hashes, encryption, signatures, etc. are used to construct these
messages. Security protocols are designed to establish high level properties such as
authenticity, confidentiality and data integrity. Formal methods such as BAN logic [6]
(applied to payment protocols in [1]), or state space exploration based methods such as
Casper/FDR [19] have been developed to help make the analysis on this level more rigor-
ous and efficient.
The second level is the low concrete level of program code (in the case of this paper
Java Card [7] source code). Specifications on this level usually consist of pre- and post-
conditions for methods, and invariants or history constraints for a class as a whole. It is
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generally acknowledged that there is a substantial gap between these high and low level
approaches, and that bridging this gap is very important. In this paper we shall try to narrow
this gap from below. We choose to take this lowest level as starting point because:
• Certification of specific, security sensitive products is expected to focus primarily on
the actual implementation, and not so much on a high level abstract description of the
system;
• Refinement is a problematic notion within the area of computer security: it may well
happen that by adding implementation details certain key security properties that can be
established at a high abstraction level no longer hold at a low level (because an attacker
has more material to exploit).
Within the setting of this paper we study a simple payment system that can be realized
with (Java) smart cards, running a specific applet. The applet involves a balance, which
represents an amount of electronic money. In general with such payment systems, there
are separate protocols for paying (decreasing the balance), and for charging (increasing
the balance). Our payment protocol is not very interesting, because it is extremely simple,
and does not involve any form of authentication. Charging however is less trivial, because
it involves a challenge-response mechanism in which the terminal needs to authenticate
itself, and in which at most five tries are permitted. The smart card applet that we have
developed involves an implementation of this protocol for charging.
Our aim in this paper is to push our current program specification and verification tech-
nology as far as possible for proving the correctness of the payment applet in general, and
the charging protocol in particular. The restriction to current verification technology is very
relevant, and excludes for instance specification language extensions such as in [5]. As a
result the cryptographic aspects in specification and verification are not dealt with at all.
But our approach works well for the control-flow aspects of the charging protocol. What
we achieve here may be seen as first steps towards an applet development methodology,
consisting of:
• Describing the control flow (of the applet-part of the protocol) as a finite state machine;
• Translating the transitions of this finite state machine into a class constraint, involving
a special “mode” variable capturing the states.
Elaborating the details of this methodology forms the main contribution of this paper.
Throughout this paper the emerging standard specification language for Java, the Java
Modeling Language (JML) [17,18], is employed for the specification of program properties
on this level. JML assertions are written in special comment tags in order not to confuse the
Java compiler. They can serve as precise formal documentation that can actually be verified
(in contrast to Javadoc). The syntax of the JML assertions themselves is quite similar to that
of Java’s Boolean expressions. Both normal and abnormal post-conditions can be specified
for methods. A growing collection of more or less compatible tools is becoming available
for JML, for instance the JML runtime checker [17], ESC/Java [9], Daikon [8], Krakatoa
[25], and our own tool: the Loop tool [16].
The general approach taken in this paper is bottom–up. Rather than attempting to spec-
ify and verify a fully featured industrial payment application, we describe a Java Card
applet of our own creation with minimal functionality, but whose correctness is formally
proved. The applet features some cryptography, which is traditionally thought of as hard to
specify on the program code level and which is therefore usually specified on the security
protocol level. Therefore it plays only a minor role in our verification effort.
It should be emphasized that the Java code in this paper is our own. It is written for
the purpose of verification. It has been compiled and even loaded onto a smart card, but
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it has––deliberately––not been tested.1 We wanted to see what kind of errors could be
discovered with our verification technology alone, without actually running the code. And
we actually found several program bugs, see Section 3. Yet, most of the mistakes occurred
in the specifications we wrote. Once again it became clear that writing good specifications
is much harder than writing good programs. But verifying the specifications is still the most
difficult part of all. However, it is this effort that leads to the greatest level of confidence:
knowing that one’s implementation satisfies the specification.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes how the spec-
ification of the Java Card applet came about. It also introduces some of the JML notation.
Section 3 sheds some light on different aspects of the formal proof process. Section 4 draws
some conclusions and discusses possible future work.
2. Specifying the Applet
An electronic purse applet should, at the very least, contain a balance field, say of type
short. After card issuance it should be possible to decrease balance and to consult its
current value. Initially balance is set to zero, but the card can be recharged by certain
terminals. This means the applet needs a key field as well. The key is supposed to be
loaded onto the card before the card is issued. A symmetric key is used which is shared
by any legitimate terminal.2 The card authenticates a terminal by sending a challenge.
Only a terminal equipped with appropriate credentials can respond to this challenge by
sending it back encrypted with the key. The applet keeps track of the number of consecutive
unsuccessfully answered challenges in a counter field. As soon as counter reaches five,
the card locks itself.
To make the verification of the applet a little bit more challenging, we restrict balance
to 12 bit signed values, to be interpreted as the number of euro cents on the card. This means
that the maximum amount on the card is 40 euros and 96 cents, which seems reasonable for
a simple electronic purse. It also means that the applet’s source code will contain several
bitwise operations such as shifts and masking. The Loop tool has support for verification
of such operations, though this is still in a developmental stage.
Smart cards are instructed to perform certain operations through so-called Application
Protocol Data Units (APDUs). Within a Java Card applet the process method is responsi-
ble for managing the incoming command APDUs once the applet has been selected. Every
command APDU contains an instruction byte which is examined by the process method.
The applet will throw an ISOException whenever the terminal sends a command that is
not understood or not appropriate in the applet’s current state. Exceptions show up on the
terminal side as special return codes in the response APDU.
Instruction bytes for the electronic purse applet described above are encoded inside the
applet as follows:
• INS_SETKEY sets the 56 bit Data Encryption Standard (DES) key. The data field should
contain the eight bytes of key data.
• INS_GETVAL returns the value of balance. The response APDU that is to be expected
contains a data field of two bytes with the current balance.
• INS_DECVAL decreases the value of balance with 1 cent.
1 Indeed, there is no ‘select’ case in our process methods below.
2 This may very well be a diversified key, but that is irrelevant for the applet itself.
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• INS_GETCHAL asks the applet to generate a challenge (a random nonce) and send it back
to the terminal application. The response APDU that is to be expected contains the 32
byte nonce. The applet increases the counter field for each requested challenge.
• INS_RESPOND responds to the card challenge by sending a 24 byte encrypted hash of
the nonce. The APDU also includes a new value for balance in the last two bytes of
the decrypted cipher text array. A successful response to a challenge resets the counter
field.
The challenge-response protocol implemented by the last two commands can be formu-
lated in standard security protocol notation as:
C → T : Nonce
T → C : {Hash(Nonce), NewValue}K
where C stands for the card, T for the terminal, and K for the shared key. If the response
from the terminal checks out, the current value of balance is replaced by NewValue. Note
that since the new value is also encrypted, a replay or a man-in-the-middle attack is not
possible as an attacker would have to know K to change NewValue. Even though this is
a very basic authentication protocol, we checked the absence of such attacks by using the
security protocol compiler Casper [19] in combination with the model checker FDR [10].
It presented no problems.
Not every command is always appropriate. For instance, APDUs with the INS_SETKEY
instruction byte should no longer be taken seriously by the applet once the card has been
issued. The applet’s current state is made explicit in the implementation by using a dedi-
cated field called mode with values for INIT, ISSUED, CHARGING, and LOCKED. Initially mode
equals INIT. Once the key has been set, mode is changed to ISSUED. As soon as the terminal
requests a challenge, mode is switched to CHARGING. The subsequent command will switch
mode back to ISSUED. When five or more challenges are left unanswered, mode becomes
LOCKED and the applet will no longer respond to commands.
The mode field implements a rudimentary lifecycle model comparable to those described
for example in [11,20]. Usually such a model identifies different standard stages of an
applet’s life, for example: Installation, Personalization, Processing, and Locked. Of course,
for concrete applets the Processing life stage can usually be refined into more detailed
stages. Sending specific commands to the applet may result in a change of its state. This
gives rise to the finite state machine in Fig. 1.
Fig. 1. A finite state machine describing the lifecycle model of the applet.
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Such an explicit representation of the applet’s state makes formulating global properties
much easier when writing the specification. In fact, some of the applet’s code and specifi-
cation can be systematically derived from the finite state machine. In the implementation
of the process method we created dedicated helper methods for each of the possible in-
struction bytes. These helper methods are only called from the process method, which
consists of two levels of nested switch statements. The outermost switch performs a case
analysis on the mode field, while the innermost switches examine the instruction byte to
call the corresponding helper method.
/*@ behavior
@ requires apdu != null && random != null
@ && cipher != null && digest != null;
@ modifiable mode, balance, counter, apdu.buffer[*],
@ key[*], cipher, nonce[*];
@ ensures true;
@ signals (ISOException) true;
@*/
public void process(APDU apdu) throws ISOException {
byte ins = apdu.getBuffer()[OFFSET_INS];
switch(mode) {
case INIT:
switch(ins) {
case INS_SETKEY: setKey(apdu); break;
default: ISOException.throwIt(
SW_CONDITIONS_NOT_SATISFIED);
}; break;
case ISSUED:
switch(ins) {
case INS_GETVAL: getValue(apdu); break;
case INS_DECVAL: decValue(apdu); break;
case INS_GETCHAL: getChallenge(apdu); break;
default: ISOException.throwIt(
SW_CONDITIONS_NOT_SATISFIED);
}; break;
case CHARGING:
switch(ins) {
case INS_GETVAL: getValue(apdu); break;
case INS_DECVAL: decValue(apdu); break;
case INS_RESPOND: respond(apdu); break;
default: ISOException.throwIt(
SW_CONDITIONS_NOT_SATISFIED);
}; break;
case LOCKED: ISOException.throwIt(
SW_SECURITY_STATUS_NOT_SATISFIED);
default: ISOException.throwIt(
SW_CONDITIONS_NOT_SATISFIED);
}
}
112 B. Jacobs et al. / Journal of Logic and Algebraic Programming 58 (2004) 107–120
Because the high level properties of the applet are captured in global invariants and
constraints, the specification of the process method itself is not terribly interesting. The
local specifications (in terms of pre- and post-conditions) of the dedicated methods capture
the more detailed functional behavior of those methods. An example of such a method
specification is given in Section 3 for the methods dealing with APDUs whose instruc-
tion byte is INS_GETCHAL or INS_RESPOND. Those specifications exactly describe the
behavior of the counter field as a result of the method invocations. The global prop-
erties are stated in the class invariant and class constraint. The class invariant reads as
follows:
/*@ invariant
@ (mode == INIT || mode == ISSUED ||
@ mode == CHARGING || mode == LOCKED)
@ && 0 <= counter && counter <= 5
@ && (mode == LOCKED <==> counter == 5)
@ && (mode == INIT ==> counter == 0)
@ && 0 <= balance && balance <= 4096
@ && key != null && key.length == DES_KEY_SIZE
@ && nonce != null && nonce.length == NONCE_SIZE
@ && sha_nonce != null && sha_nonce.length == SHA_SIZE
@ && plaintxt != null && plaintxt.length == SHA_SIZE+2
@ && ciphertxt != null && ciphertxt.length == CIPHERTEXT_SIZE;
@*/
The first four conjuncts are the most interesting. They express that the applet can be
only in one of four states (INIT, ISSUED, CHARGING or LOCKED); that the counter that
keeps track of the number of unsuccessful challenge-responses is at most five; that the
state LOCKED corresponds to the counter having the maximum value five; and that in the
INIT mode the counter equals zero. Such invariant properties typically make explicit what
the programmer has in the back of his/her mind.
The class constraint conveys more interesting information as it captures the intended
flow of control. A constraint expresses a relation between the pre-state (indicated by \old)
and the post-state, which should hold for all method invocations. Part of the constraint
is generated automatically using the prototype F2J tool described in [13]. To emphasize
that part of the constraint is generated automatically we list two constraints. In the actual
verification of the applet these are simply conjuncted. The eight parts of the generated
constraint describe the possible transitions from the different states. Note that sending a
command that is not supported by the applet does not cause a change of state. This in-
duces reflexive transitions from each state to itself, which are not explicitly specified in
Fig. 1.
/*@ constraint
@ (mode == LOCKED ==> \old(mode) == ISSUED
@ || \old(mode) == LOCKED) &&
@ (mode == INIT ==> \old(mode) == INIT) &&
@ (mode == ISSUED ==> \old(mode) == INIT
@ || \old(mode) == ISSUED
@ || \old(mode) == CHARGING) &&
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@ (mode == CHARGING ==> \old(mode) == ISSUED
@ || \old(mode) == CHARGING) &&
@ (\old(mode) == LOCKED ==> mode == LOCKED) &&
@ (\old(mode) == INIT ==> mode == ISSUED
@ || mode == INIT) &&
@ (\old(mode) == ISSUED ==> mode == ISSUED
@ || mode == CHARGING
@ || mode == LOCKED) &&
@ (\old(mode) == CHARGING ==> mode == ISSUED
@ || mode == CHARGING);
@*/
The second constraint was manually entered and captures the relation between balance,
counter and mode.
/*@ constraint
@ (\old(mode) == LOCKED ==>
@ (balance == \old(balance) &&
@ counter == \old(counter) &&
@ mode == LOCKED)) &&
@ (\old(mode) == ISSUED ==>
@ ((mode == ISSUED && balance <= \old(balance) &&
@ counter == \old(counter))
@ || (mode == CHARGING && balance == \old(balance) &&
@ counter == \old(counter + 1) && \old(counter) < 4)
@ || (mode == LOCKED && balance == \old(balance) &&
@ counter == \old(counter + 1) && \old(counter) == 4))) &&
@ (\old(mode) == CHARGING ==>
@ ((mode == ISSUED && counter == 0)
@ || (mode == ISSUED && counter == \old(counter)
@ && balance <= \old(balance))));
@*/
The first conjunct expresses that once the applet becomes LOCKED, it will remain LOCKED
and the balance and counter do not change anymore. The second one expresses that three
things can happen in the normal state of operation ISSUED: the applet can stay in the
same state, in which case the balance can only decrease––a key security property––and
the counter will not change; the applet can go into the CHARGING mode, then the balance
will not change, the counter will increase with one, and the value of the counter in the
pre-state was less than 4; the applet will become LOCKED, in this case the balance will
stay the same, the counter will again increase with one and in the pre-state the counter
field had value 4. The latter constraint describes of course a crucial safety property for a
payment applet.3 The third conjunct expresses the two possible transitions from CHARGING
3 The observant reader might notice that some of the properties specified in the invariant and constraint are
redundant. This is done deliberately, since we believe this makes the specification easier to read and thus under-
stand.
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to ISSUED. Either the response was valid, in which case the counter is reset to zero, or the
response was invalid, in which case the counter remains unchanged and the balance does
not increase.
We want to stress that in this paper we only look at the card-side of the whole payment
protocol. For the terminal-side one can also consider an appropriate finite state machine,
possibly also with code verification.
3. Correctness of the Applet specification
Once we have a (JML) specification of the intended behavior of our applet, we want to
make sure that it actually holds for the given (Java) implementation. This is done by first
translating the Java + JML code into the language of a theorem prover, via the Loop tool [2].
Next, the theorem prover is used for (interactive) verification. This approach has already
proven itself in several case studies [3,23,24] mostly involving API classes. This paper
presents the first application to a non-trivial smart card applet. The actual verification in the
theorem prover PVS [22] proceeds via a special Hoare logic for JML [14], in combination
with a recently developed weakest pre-condition calculus [15].
Discussing the verification of the whole applet would present too many details. Instead
we concentrate on the process method, described in the previous section, and on two
additional helper methods that are called by process, namely getChallenge and respond,
see below.
The most important properties to be verified are the class-wide invariant and constraint
properties. They express key security properties that should be established by all methods.
In the semantics of JML––as incorporated in the Loop tool––invariants are implicitly added
to all pre-conditions, and to all post-conditions, both for normal and abnormal termination.
Similarly, constraints are added to all post-conditions. At first sight it might seem easy to
establish the trivial (normal and abnormal) post-condition true of the process method.
But in reality, these post-conditions are far from trivial because they involve the invariant
and constraint.
The verification of the process method is essentially straightforward, and involves
making the various case distinctions in PVS, following the nested switch statements inside
the process body.4 In each case an appropriate helper method is called. During verification
of the process method, we then use the specification of the method that is called. This
means that the method’s pre-condition must be established, so that its post-condition can
be used in the remainder of the proof.
The two most prominent helper methods are getChallenge and respond. The get-
Challenge method is only called when mode is ISSUED and the incoming APDU con-
tains the INS_GETCHAL instruction. It provides a new, randomly generated nonce, to be
used in the challenge-response mechanism for authentication. For security reasons, we
keep track of how many times the getChallenge method is called until a challenge is
answered by an appropriate response. Technically, we use a private byte field counter
which is incremented with every call to getChallenge as explained in Section 2. Thus, our
4 It was at this stage that we found a serious program bug: in our first version, the outer break statements after
the three inner switches in process were not there. But the inner breaks only break out of the inner switches, not
out of the outer one!
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getChallenge method must inspect the value of this counter. It does so in the following
way:
/*@ behavior
@ requires mode == ISSUED
@ && counter < 5
@ && apdu != null
@ && apdu.buffer != null
@ && apdu.buffer.length >=
@ OFFSET_CDATA + NONCE_SIZE
@ && random != null;
@ modifiable mode, counter, nonce[*], apdu.buffer[*];
@ ensures mode == CHARGING
@ && counter == \old(counter) + 1
@ && counter < 5;
@ signals (ISOException) mode == LOCKED && counter == 5;
@*/
private void getChallenge(APDU apdu) throws ISOException {
counter++;
if (counter < 5) {
mode = CHARGING;
random.generateData(nonce,(short)0,NONCE_SIZE);
apdu.setOutgoing();
apdu.setOutgoingLength(NONCE_SIZE);
byte[] buffer = apdu.getBuffer();
Util.arrayCopy(
nonce,(short)0,buffer,OFFSET_CDATA,NONCE_SIZE);
} else {
mode = LOCKED;
ISOException.throwIt(SW_SECURITY_STATUS_NOT_SATISFIED);
}
}
Notice that the pre-condition contains certain requirements about the length of the buffer
of the incoming APDU. These requirements are actually redundant, because of the invari-
ant that we use for the APDU class. The important point is that the getChallenge method
only generates a challenge if the counter (in the pre-state) is less than 4. Recall that the
invariant says 0  counter  5. If getChallenge is called with counter equal to 4, the
applet will become locked. And the getChallenge method cannot be called by process
with counter equal to 5, because according to the constraint this means that the applet is
already locked. We thus see the importance of the invariant and constraint in determining
the appropriate flow of control.
We briefly discuss the verification of getChallenge. There are three points worth men-
tioning.
• Shortly after entering the method body, the counter is incremented and so the class
invariant gets broken: the logical equivalence mode == LOCKED <==> counter == 5
need not hold anymore. But at the end of the method the invariant is re-established. Our
semantics and proof methods can handle such temporary violations of invariants.
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Re-establishing the class invariant at the end of the method body is sufficient for Java
programs. For Java Card applets, however, a card-tear is always possible. Withdrawing
the card from the terminal in the middle of the execution of this method could leave the
applet in a state in which the invariant no longer holds. A solution to this is to use Java
Card’s transaction mechanism. Unfortunately, verification of transaction blocks is not
supported by the Loop tool yet.
• The methods that occur in the then part are handled via their specifications. These
specifications are fairly weak, and do not express any functional behavior. For instance,
the specification for the RandomData method generateData looks as follows:
/*@ normal_behavior
@ requires buffer != null && offset >= 0
@ && length >= 0 && offset + length <= buffer.length;
@ modifiable buffer[*];
@ ensures true;
@*/
public abstract void generateData(
byte[] buffer, short offset, short length);
This serves our purposes. We use similarly weak specifications for the APDU methods
setOutgoing and setOutgoingLength. But the Util method arrayCopy has a func-
tional specification—like in [3].
• The two methods setOutgoing and setOutgoingLength may generate a APDUExcep-
tion. But this is a runtime exception that we ignore in our specification of getChal-
lenge. Of course, one can choose to include it and have a more detailed specification.
The respond method is only called (within the process method from the previous
section) when mode is CHARGING and the incoming APDU contains the INS_RESPOND
instruction. The method checks whether the received response is appropriate to the chal-
lenge previously sent, and if so, it extracts the new value for balance from the APDU
buffer through some bitwise shifting and masking. (The resulting balance is described in
slightly more readable form in the ensures clause.) The method then resets the counter
field to zero. Whether or not the appropriate response is given is expressed in the JML
specification.
/*@ behavior
@ requires
@ mode == CHARGING
@ && counter < 5
@ && apdu != null
@ && apdu.buffer != null
@ && apdu.buffer.length >= CIPHERTEXT_SIZE
@ && cipher != null
@ && ciphertxt != null
@ && digest != null;
@ modifiable
@ mode, counter, balance,
@ ciphertxt[*], plaintxt[*], sha_nonce[*];
@ ensures
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@ mode == ISSUED
@ && balance == (short)(256 * (plaintxt[SHA_SIZE] & 0x0F)
@ + (plaintxt[SHA_SIZE+1] & 0xFF))
@ && counter == 0
@ && (\forall int i; 0 <= i && i < SHA_SIZE ==>
@ sha_nonce[i] == plaintxt[i]);
@ signals (ISOException e)
@ mode == ISSUED
@ && balance == \old(balance)
@ && counter == \old(counter)
@ && (apdu.buffer[OFFSET_LC] != ciphertxt.length
@ ||
@ !(\forall int i; 0 <= i && i < SHA_SIZE ==>
@ sha_nonce[i] == plaintxt[i]));
@
@*/
private void respond(APDU apdu) throws ISOException {
mode = ISSUED;
byte[] buffer = apdu.getBuffer();
if (buffer[OFFSET_LC] != ciphertxt.length) {
ISOException.throwIt(
SW_SECURITY_STATUS_NOT_SATISFIED);
};
readBuffer(apdu,ciphertxt);
cipher.doFinal(ciphertxt,(short)0,
CIPHERTEXT_SIZE,plaintxt,(short)0);
digest.doFinal(nonce,(short)0,
NONCE_SIZE,sha_nonce,(short)0);
if (Util.arrayCompare(sha_nonce,(short)0,
plaintxt,(short)0,SHA_SIZE) == 0) {
balance = (short)(((plaintxt[SHA_SIZE] & 0x0F) << 8)
| (plaintxt[SHA_SIZE+1] & 0xFF));
counter = 0;
} else {
ISOException.throwIt(
SW_SECURITY_STATUS_NOT_SATISFIED);
}
}
The issues in the verification of the respond method are similar to the ones for get-
Challenge. The proof cannot be done automatically with weakest-pre-condition calcula-
tions because there are too many complicated method calls involved. Therefore we have
used a proof in Hoare logic, with much user interaction. The resulting proof tree in PVS is
included in Fig. 2, and gives an impression of the complexity and number of interactions
(each node corresponds to a user-command). The reader is not expected to analyze the
information in each node. The bitwise operations involved present no problems in our
recent refinement of the semantics of Java’s integral types––which will be described in
detail elsewhere.
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Fig. 2. Proof tree for the respond method.
4. Conclusions
As far as we know, this paper is the first to describe a formal verification of a Java smart
card applet which uses cryptographic methods (in the form of a simple challenge-response
mechanism). Other approaches, such as in [21], concentrate on the development process,
and stop short of the actual verification. The closest work to this paper we could find is [12].
The applet they develop seems to have been verified in a dynamic logic which abstracts
away from certain Java Card details, though.
In essence, what we have verified is a correspondence between the logical control flow
and the flow of the actual Java implementation. Control flow analysis usually involves a
lot of data abstraction. In contrast, our approach uses no data abstraction at all. This makes
sure that methods are called in an appropriate order, obeying security sensitive restrictions–
such as the upper limit on the number of outstanding challenge-responses. Furthermore it
is possible to find actual implementation errors which can prove to be security critical.
Low level implementation issues, such as overflow of data types and unwanted exceptions,
simultaneously with control flow properties can thus be detected.
This work forms part of the European Research project VerifiCard [26], on tool-assisted
verification of Java smart cards. It shows that actual verification of smart card applets
is becoming feasible (see also [4]). However, it is still a non-trivial effort, not only the
verification itself, but also the development of appropriate formal specifications. Yet, this
investment forces the developers to think very carefully about their code. We think that
our formalized approach with explicit states and state-based switching within the process
method may serve as a blueprint for other applets.
Of course, this is not the final story. There are several aspects left for future research–
such as transactions, authentication, links with abstract protocol descriptions, verification
with a more complete API specification,more complex Java Card applications––which
provide ample material for future work.
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